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Will Discovery Kill Arbitration?
Kevin Mason*
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the rising cost of litigation, arbitration has become the faster and
less expensive alternative for resolving business disputes.1 Arbitration is a ìprivate
system of adjudication where parties agree to refer their dispute to an arbitral
tribunal of their choice, and to accept the tribunals decision as final and binding.ê2
Most arbitrations include aspects of litigation, such as discovery, which the parties
agree upon beforehand. Essentially, the parties contract for how they want their
dispute to be handled, and within those terms, the arbitrator hears both sides and
makes a decision.3 Arbitration is often an attractive option because it is efficient in
terms of both time and economic resources.4 However, since the expansion of
discovery in arbitral procedures, arbitrations take longer, potentially rendering
arbitration a less advantageous option than it was in the past.5
Historically, in the United States, pre–arbitration discovery was of minimal
importance.6 Arbitration was first seen as a way for small issues to be resolved with
ìswift, rough justice.ê7 The parties to an arbitration felt this form of justice was
acceptable due to the small size and nature of the disputes brought to arbitration at
that time.8 In fact, in many other countries, pre–arbitration discovery is still a non–
issue.9 The laws of France and Spain, for example, provide for little to no pretrial
discovery, and as a result, these countries do not have persisting issues with pre–
arbitration discovery.10 In the United States, on the other hand, pre–arbitration
discovery has become more extensive because the issues brought to arbitration have
grown in size and importance.11 Now, the arbitration of complex issues with
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millions of dollars at stake is common, and lawyers have fought to incorporate
elements from litigation, including more expansive discovery, into the arbitration
process so parties may present their best case to the tribunal.12
Though lawyers are advocating for expansive discovery procedures to facilitate
the best–tried arbitrations for their clients, expansive discovery could cause
arbitration to lose its key features or lead to abuses by repeat players within the
arbitral system.13 Discovery with few limitations can make arbitrations more
expensive and slower. While the average arbitration is approximately twenty
months faster than the average trial, the time it takes for an arbitration to begin has
been steadily increasing.14 Moreover, without a central binding authority defining
or limiting the extent of discoveryîthus leaving that determination to the partiesî
arbitrators can only suggest how discovery should be handled.15
This Comment will explore the reasons for the increase in discovery and
discuss whether anything should be done to stifle the growth of pre–arbitration
discovery. Section II will review the origins and history of arbitration in the United
States and is followed by Section III, a discussion of why discovery must, in fact,
be limited to preserve the advantages of arbitration. Section IV will explore the
recent development of electronic discovery and its effects on the discovery process
within arbitration. Finally, Section V will consider the use and advantages of an
electronic neutral during pre–arbitration discovery as a way to streamline the
discovery process. Ultimately, this Comment argues one of the key attributes of
arbitration, its speed as compared to litigation, would be better preserved by limiting
the discovery process in arbitration.
II. THEHISTORY OFARBITRATION IN
THEUNITED STATES
To understand how arbitration reached its current state as a ìprivate forum for
litigation practices,ê it is necessary to understand arbitrations origin and
evolution.16 Arbitration first came into wide use in Western Europe within the
regions maritime–based economy.17 There, arbitration was used to minimize
conflict between merchants and allow business relationships to carry on in a
profitable manner during a dispute.18 Had parties litigated instead, the business
relationship would likely have ceased.19
Arbitration was brought to North America well before the formation of the
United States by colonizers from Western Europe.20 Documents dated as early as
the 1640s from the Massachusetts colony outline the settlement of a dispute over
carpentry work through arbitration.21 George Washington, the first President of the
12. Id.
13. Hossam M. Fahmy, Arbitration: Wiping Out Consumers Rights?, 64 TEX. B.J. 917, 920 (2001).
14. Id.
15. Wilkinson, supra note 5.
16. Steven Certilman, Throw Down the Muskets, Seek Out the Town Elders, 3 N.Y. STATEBARASS’N




20. Henry S. Fraser, A Sketch of the History of International Arbitration, 11 CORNELL L. REV. 179,
198 (1926).
21. Certilman, supra note 16.
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United States, even recommended arbitration in his will, writing that all ìdisputes
(if unhappily any should arise) shall be decided by three impartial and intelligent
men, known for their probity and good understanding; two to be chosen by the
disputants each having the choice of one and the third by the two of those.ê22
The use of arbitration boomed after the Civil War in response to the rise of
disputes between African Americans and former slave–owners and disputes over
land rights within the former Confederate States.23 In 1871, the New Orleans
Cotton Exchange became one of the first sizeable entities to fully move to
arbitration as the means by which it settled all its disputes.24 Like the maritime
businesses of Western Europe, the New Orleans Cotton Exchange favored
arbitration because it was fast and allowed business to continue during a dispute.25
Similarly, when disputes involved farming ground, disputants turned to arbitration
because they needed their issues resolved quickly so they could continue farming,
producing, and earning income.26
As the Industrial Revolution continued in the United States, trade groups
realized arbitrations advantagesîits speed, simplicity, and low costsîand began
adding bylaws that adopted arbitration as the primary method of dispute
resolution.27 Moreover, trade groups placed great value on being able to continue
working relationships with parties after the dispute was decided, and arbitration
allowed for quasi–litigation while also enabling the parties to continue a partnership
that litigation would otherwise likely destroy.28
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (ìFAAê) was the first statute supporting
arbitration, thus solidifying arbitrations place in United States dispute resolution.29
The FAAs goal was to overcome judicial hostility towards alternative dispute
resolution (ìADRê) and help provide a framework for moving disputes to
arbitration.30 The FAA concerns maritime disputes and states, in relevant part,
disputes would be ìembraced within admiralty jurisdiction.ê31 It is important to
note that the FAA does not reference pre–arbitration discovery explicitly.32
However, Section 7 of the FAA indirectly touches on discovery by conferring
arbitrators power to summon any person to appear before the arbitrator and bring
ìany book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed as material as
evidence in the case.ê33
In 1970, U.S. arbitration reached another major milestone when the New York
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this point, the use of arbitration in the U.S. substantially increased.35 In fact, the
impact of adopting the New York Convention is still visible today, as arbitration
continues to be the main forum to decide international disputes amongst U.S.
businesses and disputes between foreign and domestic businesses with huge
economic stakes.36 Between 1962 and 2002, there was an eighty–four percent
decrease in the number of cases decided by federal courts.37 Understandably,
ìbecause of expense and delay, both civil bench trials and civil jury trials are
disappearing.ê38 As the use of civil litigation decreased, the use of arbitration
increased.39 Over time, the arbitration procedures of the past have evolved and
adopted processes that were previously reserved for the courtroom. The benefits of
arbitration are at risk because discovery, particularly electronic discovery, is
becoming more prevalent as parties seek to build the best arguments possible to win
in the arbitral tribunal.
III. LIMITINGDISCOVERY TO PRESERVE
ARBITRATIONS BENEFITS
With the expansion of discovery in litigation, arbitration has followed suit.40
Disputants understandably want to uncover as much evidence as they can to have
the best–tried arbitration possible, especially in corporate disputes when millions of
dollars are on the line.41 That said, disputants and arbitrators alike should proceed
with caution in order to preserve the benefits of arbitration.42 Discovery,
particularly electronic discovery, can be very expensive and time–consuming.43
The longer it takes to complete pre–arbitration discovery, the more time and
resources the parties expend,44 and the more arbitrations key benefits are eroded.45
Although arbitration is still much faster and more economical, on average, than
litigation, complaints of increased time and money in arbitration are rising.46
Survey findings indicate that arbitration users who were dissatisfied with the speed,
efficiency, and economy of arbitration believe the issues they encountered were due
to excessive discovery in arbitration over fifty percent of the time.47
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. College of Commercial Arbitrators, Protocols for Expeditious, CostæEffective Commercial
Arbitration: Key Action Steps for Business Users, Counsel, Arbitrators, and Arbitration Provider








44. Carolyn B. Lamm, Eckhard R. Hellbeck, & Nikolaos Tsolakidis, International Arbitration in a
Globalized World, 20 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2, 4 (2014).
45. Natl Conference of Commrs on Unif. State Law, Uniform Rules Relating to the Discovery of
Electronically Stored Information (Aug. 3, 2007), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/D
ownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=57388cb7-b6a0-4520-6f3d-099ea2e8fe3e&forceDialo
g=0.
46. Wilkinson, supra note 5.
47. College of Commercial Arbitrators, supra note 37.
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Organizations such as the American Bar Association (ìABAê) and the
American Arbitration Association (ìAAAê) are taking measures to limit the scope
of discovery, such as advocating for arbitrators to take a more hands–on approach
in the pre–arbitration stage, but practitioners, arbitrators, and participating parties
must intentionally bring these mitigating factors into play.48 The New York State
Bar Association (ìNYSBAê) issued Guidelines for the Arbitrator’s Conduct of the
PreæHearing Phase of Domestic, Commercial Arbitrations (ìGuidelinesê) in
2009.49 Shortly thereafter, in 2010, the College of Commercial Arbitrators
(ìCCAê) released Protocols for Expeditious, CostæEffective Commercial
Arbitration (ìProtocolsê).50 Both NYSBAs Guidelines and CCAs Protocols
attempt to keep arbitration cost–and–time–effective by examining the arbitration
process through the varied perceptions of businesses, in–house counsel, outside
counsel, and arbitrators.51 The main way both sources attempt to increase efficiency
is by limiting the pre–arbitration discovery process so that only the most relevant
information is discoverable.52
If all participants to arbitrations do not proactively implement Guidelines
and/or Protocols, or similar mitigating tactics as suggested below, the benefits of
arbitration will continue to erode until they have been lost altogether. However, if
arbitrators can impress on the parties the need for arbitrator control over the
discovery process, then the key benefits of arbitration over litigation, mainly its
speediness and low cost, will be better preserved.
A. NYSBA Guidelines
One serious problem in pre–arbitration discovery procedures is
inconsistency.53 Inconsistent pre–arbitration discovery procedures have led to an
unfortunate unpredictability, leaving parties wondering what to expect from the
pre–arbitration process.54 Some arbitrators allowmassive discovery and, as a result,
the parties lose all the benefits of arbitration. Other arbitrators are so focused on
preserving the efficiency of arbitration that the process yields poor outcomes due to
the lack of discovery, essentially robbing arbitration of its credibility as a dispute
resolution mechanism.55 The goal of Guidelines is to help arbitrators navigate the
muddied waters and conduct an efficient proceeding while still enabling the parties
to fully present their cases.56
Guidelines sets a definite scope of discovery at the outset of the process before
more concrete issues within the discovery process arise, thus avoiding uncertainty





53. Guidelines for the Arbitrator’s Conduct of the PreæHearing Phase of Domestic Commercial
Arbitrations & Guidelines for the Arbitrator’s Conduct of the PreæHearing Phase of International
Arbitrations, N.Y. STATE BARASSN DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION 5 (2009), https://www.adr.org/sit
es/default/files/document_repository/NYSBA%20Guidelines%20for%20the%20Arbitrator%27s%20C
onduct.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines for the Arbitrator’s Conduct].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 6.
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and surprise during the pre–arbitration discovery period.57 Early attention to the
scope of the discovery increases the likelihood that the parties choose to focus on
fairness and efficiency instead of the partisan positions that inevitably move to the
forefront as the arbitration proceeds.58 Guidelines also instructs arbitrators to ìset
ambitious hearing dates and aggressive interim deadlines which, the parties are told,
will be strictly enforced, and which, in fact, are thereafter strictly enforced.ê59
When an arbitrator does so, the parties are forced to stay on track and be efficient
with their discovery, so as not to miss any of the imposed deadlines and potentially
hurt their case.60
The drafters of Guidelines also suggest setting a definite scope for document
requests.61 Document requests should be limited to ìdocuments which are directly
relevant to significant issues in the case or to the cases outcomeê and ìrestricted in
terms of time frame, subject matter and persons or entities to which the requests
pertain, and should not include broad phraseology such as èall documents directly
or indirectly related to.ê62 Limiting document requests in this manner will ensure
that discovery returns only the documents that are most relevant, thereby preserving
efficiency.63
B. CCA Protocols
Shortly after the NYSBA published Guidelines, the CCA published
Protocols.64 In agreement with the NYSBA, the drafters of Protocols believe the
root cause of present–day efficiency problems to be arbitrations growing similarity
to litigation, due primarily to the increasingly high stakes of commercial
arbitration.65 The two main ways Protocols found arbitration to resemble litigation
were in the pre–arbitration discovery process and in motion practice.66 Protocols
aims to preserve the key features of arbitration by encouraging arbitrators to provide
more detail about the arbitration process on the front end and explain, in particular,
the elements of the process.67 Arbitrating ìunder [standard rules] without
specifying in more detail . . . how discovery will be handled . . . [will result in] a
proceeding similar to litigation.ê68 Therefore, the most important step an arbitrator
can take to facilitate an efficient arbitration is to intentionallyîand explicitlyî
control the discovery process to the best of his or her ability.69
Although parties must agree, arbitrators can control discovery in multiple
ways.70 As suggested byProtocols, arbitrators can provide varied discovery options
for the parties to choose from at the immediate outset of the dispute, before the
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id. at 7.




63. Id. at 7.
64. College of Commercial Arbitrators, supra note 37.
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 22.
70. College of Commercial Arbitrators, supra note 37.
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discovery process has even started.71 Similarly, arbitrators can schedule
checkpoints within the discovery process to stay actively involved in the
arbitration.72 Finally, Protocols states the best way an arbitrator can ensure an
efficient discovery process is to limit its scope to what is absolutely necessary and
limit parties ability to change the scope of discovery to instances in which they can
demonstrate hardship.73 These tactics can reduce costs, even if only by avoiding
disagreements over the scope of discovery.74
C. Barriers to Limiting Discovery
In addition to arbitrators, parties can also limit discovery by specifying the
scope of discovery in the arbitration agreement.75 Limiting discovery in this manner
is very efficient, but may not always uncover the most effective arguments, as
different disputes necessitate varying amounts of discovery.76 On the opposite end
of the spectrum, if both parties desire unlimited discovery, there is, unfortunately,
nothing the arbitrator can do; he or she must simply respect the parties decision
and disregard Guidelines and Protocols.77 In such a situation, the arbitrator must
make clear to the parties the likely negative consequences of such broad
discoveryîincreased time and money.78
The potential legal ramifications of limiting discovery too much are a
legitimate concern for arbitrators.79 Section 10 of the FAA states that one of the
few situations in which an arbitration award may be vacated is ìwhere the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing . . . to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy.ê80 This has led some arbitrators to allow overly
extensive discovery out of fear that their award could otherwise be challenged.81 It
is worth nothing that the drafters ofGuidelines believe this concern to be overstated,
as very few arbitral awards have been vacated due to a lack of discovery.82
IV. ELECTRONICDISCOVERY ANDARBITRATION
Electronic discovery is becoming more common, but remains notoriously
resource–intensive, rapidly consuming both time and money.83 Electronic
discovery is the technological aspect of identifying, collecting, and producing
electronically stored information (ìESIê) in response to a request for
production.84 ESI includes, but is not limited to: emails, documents, presentations,
71. Id. at 22.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 29
74. Id.
75. Id. at 26.
76. College of Commercial Arbitrators, supra note 37.
77. Id. at 22.
78. Id.
79. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1947).
80. Id. at § 10(a)(3).
81. Guidelines for the Arbitrator’s Conduct, supra note 53, at 11.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Wilkinson, supra note 5.
84. The Basics: What is eæDiscovery?, COMPLETE DISCOVERY SOURCE, https://cdslegal.com/knowle
dge/the-basics-what-is-e-discovery/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
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databases, voicemails, audio and video files, social media posts, and websites.85
ESI has become much more prevalent in the last two decades as more and more
information is created and stored electronically.86 ESI can provide a multitude of
relevant, easily accessible documents, but it is both time–consuming and expensive,
which puts it at odds with the core goals of arbitration.87 Today, over ninety percent
of business information is stored electronically.88 Thus, ESI is simply unavoidable.
The existence of ESI, of course, is not a problem on its own; it is the complexity
of the technology that makes requesting, producing, and analyzing ESI so
burdensome. ESI is often difficult to sift through due to the sheer volume of data
produced and the intricacies of the files.89 Electronic documents are dynamic,
meaning they store more information than just the words in the document,90 thus
adding another complication to the search process.91 Metadata must often be
preserved, as it may later have ramifications for dispute resolution; if metadata is
not preserved, claims of spoliation may arise during arbitration.92 Because many
parties are unequipped to handle the challenges of producing or filtering through
ESI, electronic discovery can quickly threaten arbitrations speed and lower cost,
once again, bringing it closer to litigation.
As ESI has developed, its use in the discovery process has become more
common in litigation and, in turn, arbitration.93 Due to the aforementioned
complexity, parties should be cautious before diving into electronic discovery.94 In
many cases, though, electronic discovery can no longer be avoided because the
world is becoming increasingly digital.95 More than ever before, arbitrators must
take an active role in the discovery process if the benefits of arbitration are to be
fully realized.96 The most important step an arbitrator can take is to determine the
exact parameters for the use of ESIîscope of discovery, deadlines, preservation,
and preliminary production issuesîin the initial stages of the arbitration.97
A. Scope of Discovery
At the beginning of the discovery process, data is analyzed to distinguish the
clearly non–relevant documents and emails from relevant ones.98 Next, the data is
hosted in a secure environment and made accessible to reviewers who code the
documents for their relevance to the legal matter being disputed.99 Finally,
potentially relevant data is collected and then extracted, indexed, and placed into a
85. Id.
86. Wilkinson, supra note 5.
87. Id.
88. Natl Conference of Commrs on Unif. State Law, supra note 45.
89. Id.
90. Electronic documents, for example, often contain metadata such as timestamps, author
information, recipient information, and file properties. Id.
91. Natl Conference of Commrs on Unif. State Law, supra note 45.
92. Wilkinson, supra note 5.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Natl Conference of Commrs on Unif. State Law, supra note 45.
96. Id.
97. Richard Posell, EæDiscovery in Arbitration, MEDIATE.COM: EVERYTHING MEDIATION (May
2010), https://www.mediate.com/articles/posellR1.cfm.
98. Id.
99. The Basics: What is eæDiscovery?, supra note 84.
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database.100 To effectively engage in this process, parties must understand what
they need and what the other side has requested, whether that be just a few emails
or volumes of research data and business documents.101
As stated previously, defining the procedure and scope of discovery and
production will help to mitigate disagreements later on, allowing for a more
efficient arbitration process. Even if the scope of discovery changes, dictating
scope early on will give all sides the chance to consider ways to limit discovery
costs.102
B. Deadlines
Counsel should use the first preliminary conference to gain an understanding
of some realistic discovery and hearing dates, or to commit to reschedule a
conference for the purpose of determining such dates.103 If, during this pre–
arbitration period, the arbitrator determines that more work remains to ensure an
efficient arbitration, a ìmeet and conferê should be ordered.104 A meet and confer
is a meeting between the arbitrator and the parties to determine potential impasses
and develop a plan to continue the arbitration.105
The meet and confer should be viewed as a discovery crossroads.106 If isolated
issues remain unresolved but the parties are in agreement about the majority of
issues pertaining to discovery, then the arbitrator should order the parties to resolve
the isolated issues.107 Examples of isolated issues that can likely be addressed in a
meet and confer include the retention of privileged information, cost shifting, and
the format of the data being produced.108 These issues are fairly minor in the overall
scheme of the discovery process, and the parties should be able to resolve them in
a face–to–face meeting. The ideal outcome of the meet and confer is that all
remaining issues are resolved and the discovery process can move forward.109
C. Preservation
After data is identified by parties in a dispute, relevant documents are placed
under a legal hold,110 meaning they cannot be modified, deleted, erased, or
otherwise destroyed.111 Oftentimes the relevant documents are converted to a static
format, such as a TIFF or PDF,112 making redaction of privileged and non–relevant
information possible while also making substantive alterations impossible.113
100. Id.










111. The Basics: What is eæDiscovery?, supra note 84.
112. ìPDFê stands for Portable Document Format, and ìTIFFê stands for Tagged Image File Format.
File Types Explained, UC DAVIS STUDENT DISABILITY CTR., https://sdc.ucdavis.edu/document-conver
sion/file-types-explained (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
113. The Basics: What is eæDiscovery?, supra note 84.
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The arbitrator may need to take an active role in the discovery process to ensure
that the information is being preserved.114 For example, the arbitrator can set strict
deadlines and enforce penalties for parties who do not produce electronic discovery
or destroy ESI. Additionally, if a party destroys electronic documents, the arbitrator
can assume the information destroyed was detrimental to the party who destroyed
it.115 If a party is unwilling to take the necessary steps to preserve information, a
court order, obtained by one of the parties, may be necessary before the arbitration
can continue.116
D. Other Preliminary Production Issues
During preliminary production, the arbitrator should question whether counsel
knows enough about their clients systems and data storage to make commitments
about some or all of the requested information.117 Are counsel sufficiently versed
in the relevant technological issues to gather the necessary information, or will
additional expertise be needed to address these issues?118 Electronic discovery
experts may be required if the clients use highly–technical systems to store their
data or if it is apparent that discovery will require technical expertise not possessed
by the parties attorneys.119
Electronic discovery expertsîpeople who have expertise in filtering and
finding electronically stored dataîcan create search protocols that are efficient
while not being over or under–inclusive, protect proprietary information, and
produce the data reliably and in a user–friendly format.120 If the arbitrator concludes
that a technical expert is necessary, the arbitrator may strongly urge the parties to
add such an expert to the roster of attendees.121 In some cases, the need to hire such
an expert is obvious and justified by the value of the dispute.122 While bringing in
technical experts may create an added financial burden, doing so early in the arbitral
process may help avoid costly mistakes and save multiples of the added cost in
attorney time.123 If parties resist, the arbitrator may hire his or her own expert and
allocate the costs appropriately.124
114. Posell, supra note 97.
115. E–DISCOVERY: THE FEDERALRULES IN THE DIGITALAGE, https://www.sgrlaw.com/ttl-articles/8
20/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). This mirrors the stance of many U.S. jurisdictions that allow a jury to
assume that the evidence destroyed was detrimental to the party destroying it. Suppression Spoliation
of Evidence, LAW OFFICES OF KELLY& CONTE (July 9, 2017), https://www.chestercountycriminallawy
er.com/blog/2017/07/suppression-spoinlation-of-evidence/.
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V. THEUSE OF ELECTRONICNEUTRALS
INARBITRATIONDISCOVERY
Electronic discovery, as well as budgetary restraints, have increased the need
for experts in arbitration.125 Budgetary restraints make experts attractive because,
even though they cost more money when hired up front, their expertise will
streamline the pre–arbitration discovery process and, in the end, save parties
money.126 Furthermore, there is a great need for electronic neutrals in arbitration
discovery because so few attorneys and arbitrators are equipped to take on the
unique challenges that ESI poses.127 Fortunately, retaining an electronic neutral is
more than just a necessity, as it benefits parties in arbitration in multiple ways.128
The assistance of an electronic neutral in navigating electronic discovery is one way
arbitrators and parties can manage discovery, thereby preserving arbitrations
benefits.
Electronic neutrals go by many titles including special master, discovery
arbitrator, and discovery referee.129 Despite the various names, these individuals
all perform the same task: produce electronic information.130 An electronic neutral
is generally an attorney with specific training in electronic discovery and alternative
dispute resolution who acts as an amalgam of a judge and an expert.131 There are
two types of electronic neutrals: ones that facilitate discovery and ones that act as
decision–makers.132 Blogger Craig Ball describes an electronic neutrals job as ìthe
sorts of things that the judge assigned to a case would do if the judge had more time
and technical expertise, and that a neutral information technology (ìITê) expert
would do if the expert were an experienced trial attorney.ê133
The legal training of an electronic neutral allows him or her to know what
discovery is important and what is not.134 Electronic expertise supplements
electronic neutrals legal knowledge, allowing them to navigate deeply into the
digital realm.135 Electronic neutrals help promote transparency and cooperation
between the parties where possible and provide direction on discovery issues when
the parties cannot reach a consensus.136 By bringing in an electronic neutral, parties
can save time andmoney during an arbitration.137 These two benefits align perfectly
with arbitrations key attribute of efficiency.138
When parties consider using an electronic neutral, they are understandably
concerned with cost and partisanship.139 In actuality, an electronic neutral saves
125. Allison O. Skinner, Alternative Dispute Resolution Expands Into PreæTrial Practice: An
Introduction to the Role of EæNeutrals, 13 CARDOZO. J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 113, 139 (2011).
126. Id.
127. Craig D. Ball, EæDiscovery Bulletin, IMPROVING E–DISCOVERY OUTCOMES WITH ESI SPECIAL
MASTERS (2014), http://www.craigball.com/LIT_FebMarch14_EDiscBulletin.pdf.
128. Skinner, supra note 125.
129. Id. at 114.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 133.
132. Id. at 114.
133. Ball, supra note 127.
134. Skinner, supra note 125.
135. Id. at 137.
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money140 because although electronic neutrals are generally more expensive than
traditional IT experts, the cost is split between the parties.141 Clients may be
resistant to retain an electronic neutral because they feel they are already paying the
arbitrator and attorneys to do the same work.142 However, most attorneys and
arbitrators lack the necessary technical expertise in digital matters and, as such, are
not prepared to deal with the issues specific to electronic discovery. Thus, there is
a high risk of attorneys who are not well versed in ESI overlooking or losing key
information in the discovery process. In such cases, the arbitrator may make a
binding decision in the absence of key information to the detriment of one or both
parties.143 Electronic neutrals can direct parties, help them outline the discovery
process, and guide necessary production to minimize wasted time and resources and
lessen the risks of oversight.144 Parties save time because they are not hindered by
an electronically–unskilled attorney performing electronic discovery or the
unnecessary production of many irrelevant documents.145
When material documents are mixed with privileged documents, an electronic
neutral negates the need for separate and redundant examinations of the documents
by partisan experts, again saving time and reducing costs.146 An electronic neutrals
ìability to see information withheld on claims of privilege or confidentiality without
triggering a waiver is a powerful hedge against abuse.ê147 Essentially, electronic
neutrals are valuable to arbitrating parties because they play the role of an impartial
participant whose overarching goal is to provide fair, speedy, and cost–effective
electronic discovery.148
An electronic neutral may also insulate parties from criticism during the
discovery process.149 As the discovery process proceeds, communication may
break down, and the conflict resolution process can become a new and different
conflict in itself.150 An electronic neutral can help curtail the breakdown, at least
with regard to conflicts that arise between parties over electronic discovery
issues.151 When an electronic neutral is brought into the discovery process, he or
she will first impart a clear understanding of what the disputants must do and what
they must stop doing.152 A competent electronic neutral, for example, will stop data
destructionîone of the largest concerns with ESIîand party posturing and help
the parties separate the arbitration from the discovery process.153 By reorienting
parties, the electronic neutral will prompt parties to refocus on the merits of their
claims.154 The electronic neutral should also appoint a technical liaison from each
party.155 The technical liaison should not be one of the attorneys but, rather,
140. Skinner, supra note 125, at 136.
141. Ball, supra note 127.
142. Id.
143. The Basics: What is eæDiscovery?, supra note 84.
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someone who works for a designated party and is equipped to answer questions
about the relevant digital systems, applications, and capabilities.156 Appointing a
technical liaison introduces players into the discovery process with no history of
animosity towards each other, thus establishing a culture of cooperation in the
arbitration.157
Although employing an electronic neutral may seem counterintuitive to some
attorneys, the electronic neutral plays a valuable role. An electronic neutral, at the
same time, must be prepared to remind counsel that the true beneficiaries of
cooperation are the clients, and cooperation costs parties less in time and money
while also safeguarding against both waste and sanctions.158 Having an electronic
neutral is an excellent way to promote the core tenets of arbitration.159
VI. CONCLUSION
The core benefit of arbitration is its efficiency in reducing costs and resolution
time as compared to a trial.160 The increase in pre–arbitration discovery is
threatening this efficiency.161 Arbitration practice follows trial practice, and as the
discovery process in trial has become more expansive, so has it become more
expansive in arbitration. Both the use of traditional discovery and electronic
discovery have increased, resulting in concerns about arbitrations growing
similarity to litigation.162 However, it is possible to address these complaints
through increased arbitrator control of the discovery process and the selection of an
electronic neutral for arbitrations that necessitate expansive electronic discovery.163
Without action, the benefits of arbitration are at risk of being lost.
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